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ABSTRACT
A business must recognize and address various risk factors when establishing and maintaining
its information system. The overall risk to management is that the control environment does not
protect proprietary business data and the financial reporting system that produces financial
statements and other information used by investors, creditors and regulatory agencies. These
risks require that management implement efforts to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of
control procedures over business activities while being aware of additional system issues such as
failing to adequately consider other risks which are more business-oriented including the risk of
failing to prevent or detect fraudulent or illegal activities. Worldwide in 2008 the value of
economic data stolen was estimated to be a trillion dollars. After the public outcry from the
business failures such as Enron there were efforts by the U.S. government, business community
and the accounting profession to strengthen business control environments to better address
such risk factors and thereby improving the quality of financial data.
One result of these
efforts has been that businesses are guided by the features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and
efforts by COSO (2007) which indirectly allude to but do not specifically address these risk
factors in a technology-based business environment. Currently almost all records maintained by
a business organization are now in an electronic format with over two-thirds never converted to
hard copy. The integral nature of a networked system necessitates having adequate control
aspects that ensure the confidentiality of business proprietary data and to ensure this data is not
stolen or misused. One aspect of this issue is that of insider hacking to transfer or misuse
proprietary business data. This issue and recommendations for management and their auditors
are reported in this research.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008 an estimated one trillion dollars was lost due to the theft of proprietary business data
worldwide (McMillan, 2009). Reacting to this potential loss (or fraud) a business must address
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different risk considerations when it designs, implements and/or attempts to improve its control
environment. Two different internal views of risk must be utilized by the business as it reacts to
the potential for loss due to theft of economic data or business proprietary data. One view is that
of business risk or the failure to maintain adequate managerial oversight and control over the
day-to-day operations designed to assist the business in achieving stated goals and objectives
(Internal Risk Level One). A second view is the operational risk or the failure to establish
procedures that ensure the day-to-day operations work effectively and efficiently (Internal Risk
Level Two). Operational risk is more in-depth (detailed) and includes the possible weaknesses
and/or failures of the information system department tasked to provide a secure system for the
business. A secure system would include specific procedures which will either be system-driven
tools and techniques or implemented manually by employees to prevent and/or detect the theft of
proprietary data.
Annually both internal business and operational views of risks are reviewed, utilized and
evaluated by the business’ external auditors (EA) during the planning and completion of the
annual audit of the financial statements so there is external consideration of the success and
failure of the business in controlling these risk factors. This external consideration is necessary
since the results of the business’ financial reporting system and the related audit report are used
by creditors, current and potential investors and regulatory agencies. However, the EA’s (and
the expanded accounting profession) view of risk is often overlooked by the information system
(IS) staff as they focus on the internal detailed needs of the business system. One result of
overlooking the EA evaluation of the business’ risk exposure by the IS staff is a disconnection
between IS operation and external expectation. This disconnection should be kept to a minimum
or eliminated if the business is to be successful in managing its risk factors.
Risk Factors
A useful starting point is to understand the end result a business desires from its control
environment if it is to effectively implement controls that eliminate or minimize the theft of
economic data. Thus, we begin with the EA that provides direct assurance to creditors, investors
and regulatory agencies that the results, financial statements, of the financial reporting system of
the business consists of fairly presented financial information and indirect assurance that the
client has an effective, well-managed system that reduces the likelihood of the theft of
proprietary data and/or manipulation of business information. The EA serves as the last check of
reliability before business data is made available to the public, i.e., creditors, investors,
regulators, etc., and serves to establish credibility about the fairness of presentation of the
business data as presented in the financial statements.
The EA focuses on the issue of risk from two principle perspectives: 1) internal to the client
organization and 2) external from the view of the auditor. These perspectives are attempts to
simplify the evaluation of risk using descriptive methods and are designed to include updating
risk perspectives for current changes in the global business environment including the increasing
issue of theft of economic data. Surveys have described the fact that more than 90% of all
business records are currently maintained in some type of electronic format as well as estimating
that 70% or more of these records are not ever converted to hard (printed) copy; thus, traditional
descriptive efforts to evaluate (and thus manage) risk are showing signs of aging (Montague,
2007).
Well-intended management efforts to demonstrate compliance with guidelines
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established by Sarbanes-Oxley and COSO with controls including those addressing economic
data theft as well as general business risk might still be unacceptable when an IS operations
weakness could be exploited by an employee to circumvent IS procedures over the financial
reporting system which allows management to investigate.
External Risk
The EA or certified public accountants (CPAs) engaged to audit financial statements prepared by
a client’s financial reporting systems are required to assess the risk of material misstatement
(RMM) describing a client’s internal risk (both inherent risk and control risk – discussed below).
However, additional risk categories must be considered in order for the EA to develop a
complete understanding and consideration of the entire spectrum of risk related to a specific
business audit client - detection risk and audit risk.
Detection Risk (DR). The failure by the EA to detect and assess correctly the internal (to the
corporation) risk factors and thereby not correctly assessing risk and thus being associated with
misleading financial statements and an incorrect audit report with resulting issues raised by all
external user groups. An EA will attempt to manage his/her risk by considering two types of
risk: (1) tests of details risk (TD) or the risk that audit procedures did not detect material
weaknesses in the client’s internal control system that underlies its financial reporting system,
and (2) substantive analytical procedures risk (AP) or the risk that audit procedures applied
beyond those “test of details” procedures did not detect material weaknesses in the financial
statements produced by the client’s financial reporting system.
Audit Risk (AR). The cumulative risk that an EA is associated with materially misstated
financial statements by incorrectly assessing the various components of the EA’s risk during an
audit and is a cumulative perspective of all risk factors (inherent, control and detection). The
AICPA describes a general model for understanding the general relationship of audit risk and the
other risk components described above and thereby control overall risk of releasing a report
associated with a set of financial statements by the use of numerical calculations
•
•
•

AR
=
RMM =
DR
=

RMM x DR
Inherent Risk (IR) x Control Risk (CR)
Detection Risk

The external auditor can manage (and thus control) DR during audit planning and the subsequent
application of audit procedures (TD and AP) and are found in common audit practice guides
used within the profession. (AICPA, 2007; AICPA, Internal Control, 2005) The rationale is
simple, the auditors wish to reduce or restrict their legal exposure or liability to investors,
employees and other stakeholder groups. Evidence gathered by CPAs during the conduct of an
audit of financial statements prepared (and thus subsequently published or distributed) in a
client’s financial reporting system should also be examined from two other perspectives: (1) the
detection of fraud, and (2) the impact of technology on the financial reporting system and the
related internal control system. In essence the external auditor will attempt to control his/her risk
of being associated with a client (business) that also has risks. The EA and the business attempts
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to reduce or eliminate the potential for litigation claims that investors’ losses are the result of
mismanagement.
Internal Risk
The risk that is internal to a corporation and thus the primary focus of the IS staff is the risk that efforts by
corporate management will not result in an efficient and effective system of internal control and that
internal monitoring will not reveal or detect control weaknesses and problems in a timely manner to assist
the board of directors and management in achieving its financial reporting objective. Risk management is
how these efforts are commonly referred to and it as an area of consideration by corporate management and
has evolved through the years as the failures of businesses have been made public and resulted in regulatory
action and often the passage of statutory laws designed to improve the financial reporting process vital to
investors, employees and other stakeholder groups (COSO, 2004).
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting established what became known as the
Treadway Commission to address several issues including the IR issue as the accounting professional and
the greater business community has undertaken efforts to address flaws and weaknesses in the financial
reporting efforts by regulated public businesses. In 1992 the Treadway Commission released Internal
Control—Integrated Framework as a guide to the business community and thus, the accounting profession,
as an effort to provide a structure for corporations to use in efforts to improve the existing financial
reporting systems used. This guide defined internal control as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of objectives” in three categories:
•
•
•

Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
Reliability of financial reporting
Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

The Commission stated success or failure of the internal control process is based upon a judgment of its
effectiveness by the company’s board of directors and management efforts in achieving reasonable
assurance that:
•
•
•

They understand the extent to which the entity’s operations objectives are being achieved.
Reliably published financial statements are being prepared.
They are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (AICPA , 2005).

A subsequent or follow up to the 1992 Treadway Commission effort was undertaken and
completed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), subunit of the Treadway
Commission, in 2001 led to the issuance an updated guide or framework known as Enterprise
Risk Management Integrated Framework (COSO, 2004) incorporating evolving issues since
1992 and several highly public financial reporting and business failures. Congressional action
resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (COSO, 2004).
The updated framework was completed and circulated in 2004 and provided an updated structure
for corporate management and board of directors in their efforts to evaluate and improve what
was then being labeled Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) after a series of high-profile
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business failures (and the corresponding audit failures by the accounting profession) that had led
to investors, employees and other stakeholders suffering significant losses. The goal of COSO
was to provide an improved and more complete framework that incorporated changes in how
business was conducted and was one of several attempts by the accounting profession to respond
to the perceived failures of public accounting firms in the series of business failures and the
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In the 2004 guide Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)
was defined as follows:
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across
the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and
management risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO, 2004).
These efforts have been integrated into changes in professional standards within the accounting
profession as it relates to audit engagements. The current professional standards promulgated by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 2007) described internal risk in
terms of two identifiable components: (1) inherent risk (IR) – the susceptibility that an account
or class of transactions contained within the financial statements or underlying records could be
materially misstated, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, and (2)
control risk (CR) – the susceptibility that an “inherent risk” misstatement could occur and not be
prevented or detected by the internal control system (policies and procedures) established by the
corporation (AICPA, 2007).
These two components when considered together form what may be labeled “Risk of Material
Misstatement” (RMM) – the professional assessment of both inherent and control risk when
determining the planning, completion and conclusion of an audit engagement. However, RMM is
only one aspect of the issues involved when professionals are associated with services that
involve risk and describes the risks from the perspective of the corporation and not the
accounting professional. The CPA is not able to directly manage IR and thereby control it since
it is a function of the inherent nature of an account (such as cash) and/or classes of transactions
(such as Internet-based sales). Equally important is that the CPA is not able to manage (and
thereby control) CR since it is the result of decisions, policies, procedures and the resulting
environment in which events and activities are recorded in the general ledger system and are the
underlying documentation for summarized data in the financial statements created by the board
of directors and management. However, the CPA should be able to evaluate the adequacy of the
client’s efforts to create a reasonable internal control environment that will address adequately
the IR in their financial reporting system (AICPA, 2007).
Fraud Detection
The theft of economic (proprietary) data is a form of fraud. The importance of fraud is viewed in
the context of negligence. Two degrees of negligence are important in understanding of it in
relation to audit risk and fraud: ordinary negligence or the lack of reasonable care when
performing services, and gross negligence or a lack of even minimum care when performing
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services. The profession view is found in AICPA (2007) where fraud is defined and described as
an:
Intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those
charged with governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of
deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage. Two types of
misstatements resulting from fraud are relevant to the auditor’s
consideration in a financial statement audit: misstatements arising from
fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets.
In the AICPA (2007) the responsibility to be assumed by the auditor:
Although the auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to
detect immaterial misstatements, there is a distinction in the auditor’s
response to detected misstatements depending on whether those
misstatements are caused by error or fraud. When the auditor encounters
evidence of potential fraud, regardless of its materiality, the auditor should
consider the implications for the integrity of management or employees
and the possible effect on other aspects of the audit.
The accounting profession attempts to use these definitions when assessing audit risk,
determining DR (TD and AP) and determining the implications (effectiveness) of a client’s
internal control system (IR and CR) which should be designed to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of objectives” as described by COSO in its 2004 framework: (1)
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3)
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (COSO, 2007).
DISCOVERY OF ECONOMIC THEFT WITHIN AN INFORMATION SYSTEM
The accounting professional has minimal guidance as to how auditors should gather evidence to
form the basis for their report which will be issued with a client’s audited financial statements.
Three common approaches utilized by CPAs and learned from experience by some of the
researchers are: (1) auditing around – the easiest and more common approach used within the
profession is to compare known inputs with outputs generated by a client’s information system,
(2) auditing through – the more difficult approach for CPAs to use since it requires a level of indepth knowledge about information systems and technology that most CPAs do not possess nor
do they have the technical expertise to obtain the level of understanding of technical (electronic)
control procedures in place by the information system, and (3) auditing with computer aided
tools or the practice of using computer technology to automate and/or simplify the audit process
(Wikipedia, 2007). The implications for the accounting profession to continue to select the more
traditional approach (auditing around the computer) raises the question as to whether or not
CPAs are adequately evaluating their audit risk (AR) and the detection risk (DR) component
correctly during planning for a financial statement audit, and, thereby, actually increasing their
exposure to claims of gross negligence and fraud.
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Economic Theft via Circumvention & Fraud Risk
In general one may assume that in today’s environment a business will use technology. In fact,
the level of usage is described by Montague (2007) as “90% of all records are now maintained in
electronic format and 70% of those are never printed out in hard copy.” One aspect of evidence
gathering by the CPA during a financial statement audit is to gather evidence to form an opinion
on the likelihood of Internal Risk Levels One and Two policies and procedures being
circumvented by one or more individuals including individuals on the board of directors,
executive management and/or other personnel. The awareness of any circumvention efforts must
be of interest to management and the CPA since the corporate environment of today includes a
networked information technology (IT) professional unit that utilizes virus scanning tools,
firewalls, network operating system features to manage the access to the company’s system.
However, typically IS efforts are focused on the use of well-known tools or procedures such as
matching user names to passwords and the use of firewalls to reduce the intrusions by hackers.
Equally important to the internal efforts under COSO business guidelines is the ability of IS to
know how to prevent and when necessary to detect errors or irregularities. That ability and effort
must be coordinated with the efforts of the external auditor. In today’s network environment the
EA has a level of an understanding of intrusion tools useful for those engaged in fraudulent
activities as well as effective methods detect the misuse of these tools. The EA attempts to find
the use of techniques and tools that can be used to circumvent existing security procedures in a
computer-based information system and enable unauthorized access to individuals that may wish
to obtain company information-data and/or cause malicious harm to the networked system.
Economic Data Theft Caused by Employees in the Organization (Insiders)
When hackers first try to hack into an organization’s networked system, they want to get access
to an administrative account which would allow them to access any part of the system. Barring
this, they want to compromise an account on the system from which they will try to elevate their
privileges. An employee working for the organization usually already has an account on the
system. Depending upon their job in the organization, this may even be an administrative
account. Thus, if the employees are so inclined, they have an advantage over outside hackers—
they already have approved access accounts on the organization’s system.
There have already been many instances of insiders attacking an organization’s information
system. Insiders are typically disgruntled workers and their motives are to hurt the organization
(although some have profit motives). The disgruntled workers may have been fired, laid off or
may continue to be employed by the company. For some reason, they are not happy with the
organization. They may be upset even if they think they are going to be laid off or fired. It is up
to security professionals and management to manage disgruntled workers. Make sure the
organization has an “…effective grievance procedure” (Admin, 2007). If an employee is
complaining openly about something in the organization, management should know about this.
They may want to steal corporate data or plant malicious software on the network. Passwords
for critical servers have been reset and were not given to the organization for days. Logic bombs
that could have wiped out data on 70 servers have been planted by disgruntled workers (Judi,
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2008). A contractor working at Fannie Mae is accused of planting a time bomb on its servers.
“It was only by chance that (another administrator) scrolled down to the bottom of the legitimate
script to discover the malicious script” (Lemos, 2009). The malicious script was hidden in the
legitimate script (Lemos, 2009). This may have been avoided if Fannie Mae used a monitoring
system that logged when files are modified (such as Open Source Tripwire ® (Sourceforge) ).
Also, some organizations are “…implementing file integrity monitoring as a source of
configuration control” (Tripwire, 2009).
Passwords are often used to protect sensitive corporate data. So it is especially important for the
organization to make sure secure passwords all always used by employees. If employees use
secure easily cracked passwords, the login process can be easily changed to make the passwords
more secure (Magruder, Lewis, & Burks, 2007). If the organization offers public access to their
web servers (such as may occur in an e-commerce environment), additional problems may occur.
“Security issues and threats in the e-commerce environment are varied and can be caused
intentionally and unintentionally by insiders and outsiders. Many experts believe that insiders
create the majority of the security threats and issues” (Bidgoli, 2003).
In a survey commissioned by Symantec in 2009, business organizations indicated they were
worried that employees leaving the organization may take information from the organization that
is confidential (Mills, 2009).
The survey also found that many companies seem to be lax in
protecting against data theft during layoffs. Eighty–two per cent of
the respondents said their employers did not perform an audit or
review of documents before the employee headed out the door and
24 per cent said they still had access to the corporate network after
leaving the building (Mills, 2009).

It is critical that the organization audit its information system when a disgruntled worker is
identified.
Economic downturns may affect workers ethics, according to Michael Krigsman (2009). In his
article, “IT ethics and the recession”, he reports on a survey by Cyber-Ark of 600 workers. The
interviewed employees were from three countries, the Netherlands, US and UK. “Once workers
learn they may be targeted for downsizing, their ethics may erode. Employers should be aware
of this and enhance security accordingly” (Krigsman, 2009, p.4). There are many ways an
employee can harm an organization. Lippert and Swiercz (2007) argue “that a user’s
willingness to share sensitive information on a voluntary basis”, on the Internet, “ is an area of
concern.” If an employee is not happy with the organization, will they become more or less
willing to share sensitive information on the Internet about themselves or their company? As
their article indicates, more research about this “willingness” is necessary.
Efforts to comply with current (and future) regulations/laws and to ensure the security of data are
enhanced by log file management (Howarth, 2009). Every computer has at least one log file.
Desktop computer systems have a log file. Servers have log files of users logging into their
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company accounts. They may also have logs for Web servers, database servers, etc. Some
systems have logs of individual user activity (a history of commands they executed). Internal
and external auditors, and security personnel must monitor these logs.
One question is, “How much should employees be monitored?” One answer is to monitor
everything an employee does. “RIM chief information officer Robin Bienfait, during an
interview with ZDNet.com.au in Sidney, said that all actions carried out on RIM’s internal
network were logged, which means that people who wanted to carry out private conversations
might want to bring in personal devices…. When asked exactly whether it was conversations,
rather than just written information she kept tabs on, Bienfait answered: ‘Everything. I record
everything’ ” (Tindal, 2009).
There are many types of malware that the company (management, internal and external auditors)
must check for that can “leak” company data. Although no port-knocking (Krzywinski, 2003;
Magruder & Lewis, 2005) trojan programs have been found in the wild, code samples do exist
(Mullins, 2009). Steganography (Wikipedia, 2009) can also be used to hide company data that
is being “leaked” to the outside. Corporate espionage can be done by viruses written specifically
for espionage (Magruder & Lewis, 1992). There are so many ways for a disgruntled worker to
get company data and use the network to get the data outside of the company.
Understanding the potential existence of such tools and their usage is important to financial
statement auditors and specialized auditors such as fraud examiners and forensic accountants
who are engaged to determine the nature, level and implications of activities which are
suspicious of being fraudulent including the inappropriate use of company assets-resources
including economic data. Numerous intrusion techniques (or tools) have been identified as tools
for circumvention efforts.
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Several recommendations can be gleamed from the current research that are useful to
management, IS personnel and the internal and external auditor functions. Recommendations
specific to management are presented here. In Appendix 1 is a checklist that can be used by the
internal and external audit functions and is cross-referenced within this list of recommendations.
Garrison and Roderick (2006) also provide a checklist for non-security professionals who may
not have a technical background.
1.

Educate users about password security. Enforce secure password selections either
through the system or a password generator. This should be done as part of a new
employees training and also repeated every quarter and when employees leave the
organization. Employees should be reminded not to let others use their organizational
accounts.

2.

Develop a policy regarding employees whose behavior changes. These employees may
say things against the company to other employees. Their immediate supervisors may
notice this as well. Develop a way for employees to let the organization know about
unusual activity by other employees.
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3.

Develop a policy regarding employees that may be laid off or fired. Either keep them off
the organization’s system or monitor everything they do on the system.

4.

Use a check list of actions to be taken when an employee is laid off, fired or is
disgruntled. An example checklist is given in Appendix A.

5.

Develop a policy regarding “user-developed” programs. Make sure the organization
knows about these.

6.

Consider using programmable locks on doors to sensitive areas. These are easily
changed when an employee leaves the organization. A system that records access is also
important.

7.

Develop policies regarding taking work home; laptops, CDs, DVDs, memory sticks, etc.
Minimize these actions. This should be allowed only when really needed and the
employee’s immediate supervisor must be advised of this and make a record as to what is
being taken out of the organization.

8.

Periodically check all IT policies to make sure they are up-to-date and are being
enforced.

9.

Have a specific email policy and monitor disgruntled workers email or discontinue their
email privileges.

10.

Monitor disgruntled employees.

11.

Consider that a Distributed Denial of Service attack may be a cover for an attack. It may
be used to ”clog up” the logs to hide a disgruntled worker’s attempt to get back into the
system.

12.

Check all logs periodically (volume determines how often) and especially after an
employee has left the organization. In Windows XP, the log is called “Event Log” and is
viewed in the “Event Viewer”

13.

Use a log analyzer. This will help the organization in finding any “leaking data” and help
it to make sure no disgruntled workers are getting back into the system.
Have the technology department check the company’s firewall settings to make sure they
are up-to-date.
Use a system that monitors files. This also helps with compliance with federal laws.

14.
15.

CONCLUSIONS
Several types of risk are considered by a business and its external auditor including the two
traditional perspectives of internal and external to the company. However, these risk factors
continue to change due to changes in the global marketplace. A disconnect between the external

138

Business Risks: When IS Fails to Detect

Journal of International Technology and Information Management

auditor and the IS in-house staff is a concern. Continual coordination and exchanging of
information is necessary if a business and its external auditor are to effectively manage the risk
related to the theft of economic data by employees. Checklists are provided to help
management, the internal auditor and external auditor to help to manage the risk of employees
taking company data, exposing the company to legal issues, loss of “good will” and compliance
issues.
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Appendix A
Checklist
Internal Auditor



All passwords that the employee used or had access to are changed.
The employee’s computers on the company’s network have been isolated.
The employee’s computer has been examined for



unusual configurations, programs,



backdoor programs,



time/logic bombs,



port-knocking programs (programs that can “leak” company information),



steganography programs,



malware, etc.
Note anything found.



The employee’s server account have been isolated and examined.
Note anything found.







Physical locks employee had access to have been changed.
Employee’s office and desk locks have been changed.
Scripts/programs the employee wrote or had access to or used have been examined.
Remote access for the employee has been removed.
Check computer logs
Server logs
Note unusual activity:
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Web logs
Note unusual activity:



Employee’s desktop logs
Note unusual activity:
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The employee’s name has been removed from all access lists.
The network has been checked for unauthorized account(s) the employee may have created
(backdoor).




A log analyzer is in place and being used.
The firewall settings for the company’s network have been checked.

External Auditor
Checklist



Date:




Date:



A secure password policy is in place.
What was the date the last time a company
computer account was compromised?

The company’s computer log files are
checked periodically by the technology
employees.
Check the company’s server log files.
The company has in place a “disgruntled
worker” policy.
Date the last time the “disgruntled worker”
policy was needed.
File monitoring is in place and the
generated logs are checked.
Is there evidence that the Internal auditor
consistently is using a checklist similar to
the one given above?
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